

the Buddhas of Bamiyan). But an unmistakably Iranian patriotism thrives even amid the explicitly religious rhetoric favored by leaders of the Islamic Republic.

The Persistence of Islamic Identity

Through the ideological turbulence of the past two centuries, the fundamental self-understanding of Muslims as Muslims remained intact, though sometimes tacit. The first Arab rebellion against Ottoman Turkish rule came with the rise of Wahhabiyya in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and its attempt to repair, Islamically, what it perceived as serious defects in Muslim society. Although that irruption was contained and reversed, Wahhabiyya again came to power, this time more lastingly, with the Saudi conquest of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1925. The discovery of Arabian petroleum in the 1930s has made advocates of this brand of militantly Islamic self-identification both wealthy and influential.

Resistance to European imperialism has been most effectively captained, in many instances, not by political or military officials but by popular religious figures. For example, Ahmad Brelwi, who was both an initiate of the Naqshbandi order and a Wahhabi, led armed resistance between 1826 and 1831 both to perceived encroachments of the Sikhs and to the rising menace of British power in northern India. Slightly later, from 1830 to 1859, Shamil of Daghestan, another Naqshbandi, led similar resistance against the infidel Russians, and, between 1832 and 1847, 'Abd al-Qadir, a chief of the Qadiriyya dervish order, fought the infidel French in North Africa. Likewise, the struggle of the Sanusi order in Libya against the Ottomans and, later, the Italians, and the revolt of the Sudanese Mahdi, were explicitly conducted in the name of Islam, not local patriotism.

The Young Turk revolution faced a short-lived mutiny in 1909, when members of a pan-Islamic group calling itself the "Muhammadian Union" joined with the First Army Corps to demand imposition of the *shari'a*. Later, the Young Turks themselves flirted with pan-Islamism (at least for propaganda purposes) with Enver Pasha's 1918 launch of the "Army of Islam," designed to liberate the Muslims of Russia. The previous year, the grand wazir Mehmed Said Halim Pasha had delivered a classic statement of pan-Islamic belief, declaring that "the fatherland of a Muslim is wherever the *shari'a* prevails." Even the communists, jockeying for power in the months after the fall of the Ottoman empire, found themselves constrained to invoke Islamic solidarity rather than class struggle.

The Muslim masses have continued to see the chief threat to them not in foreigners but in infidels. (That the two were often identical obscures but does not remove the distinction.) When, for example, on 2 November 1945, Egypt's political leaders invited protests to mark the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, resulting demonstrations turned into anti-Jewish riots and then into attacks on Catholic, Armenian, and Greek

Orthodox churches. In January 1952, anti-British demonstrators in Suez, angry at the British, killed several Coptic Christians—arguably Egypt's most Egyptian residents—and looted and burned a Coptic church. Meanwhile, many hundreds of miles away, the Algerian response to the French slogan of "*Algérie française*" was neither "*Algérie arabe*" nor "*Algérie algérienne*," but "*Algérie musulmane*" ("Muslim Algeria"). During the Lebanese civil war, when civil government lost effective authority over the country, residents reverted to their essential identities as Maronite Christians, Druze, and Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims.

See also 'Abd al-Qadir, Amir; 'Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Balkans, Islam in the; Dar al-Harb; Dar al-Islam; Ethnicity; Kemal, Namik; Pan-Islam; Secularization; Shaykh al-Islam; Umma; Wahhabiyya; Young Ottomans; Young Turks.

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IJTIHAD

In early Islam *ijtihad*, along with terms such as *al-ra'y*, *qiyas*, and *zann* referred to sound and balanced personal reasoning. By the third century of Islam, however, prophetic traditions replaced these terms as the primary indicators of the law after the Qur'an. The term *qiyas* remained operative but was severely curtailed by jurists of all schools. *Ijtihad*, however, was universally embraced by all jurists and theologians, including those who, in all other matters, held strongly opposing views. This was perhaps due to *ijtihad*'s authority residing

in a prophetic tradition, but more likely it was because the actual definition of the term varied from jurist to jurist. Al-Shafi'i, for instance, when asked, replied that *ijtihad* and *qiyas* are two names for the same process. Ibn Hazm, in contrast, denounced *qiyas* but not *ijtihad*. The former, he maintained, referred to baseless speculation, and the latter, to the individual's attempts at unraveling the truth by textual corroboration. All nonetheless used *ijtihad* to refer to no more than the search for the legal norm (*hukm*) in Islam's *corpus sancta* without much regard for context.

In contrast, postcolonial Islamic thinkers used *ijtihad* as shorthand for intellectual and social reform, and as a break from *taqlid* or blind imitation of past legal rulings. The Indian poet/philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, for instance, saw *ijtihad* as the catalyst for Islam's intellectual resurgence, whereas the grand mufti of Egypt, Muhammad 'Abduh, considered it a break from traditional scholarship, and Maududi as the key to establishing an Islamic political order. The relationship between *taqlid* and *ijtihad* during this period became less juridical and more symbolic: The former now referred to the general deterioration of everything Islamic and the latter to its reformation. In general, *ijtihad* served to validate the reformist's efforts to subordinate the sacred texts to the exigencies of a modern context.

While *ijtihad* was warmly received, no methodology for reasoning by *ijtihad* was established, as was the case with *qiyas*, for instance. Jurists spoke of the four essential constituents of *qiyas*, and its various forms, but in the case of *ijtihad*, spoke only of the qualifications of the *muftabids* who do *ijtihad*, and of their rankings within particular schools of law. More importantly, they spoke of the closing of the doors of *ijtihad*. The Crusades, the rise of regional dynasties subsequent to the collapse of the Abbasid empire, and the Mongol invasions were seen as threats to Islamic intellectualism in general. Coupled with this, attacks by rationalists and philosophers on Muslim orthodox thinking convinced jurists that any further *ijtihad* posed a great danger to orthodoxy itself. The doors of *ijtihad* were thus closed in the fourth Islamic century, and a long period of *taqlid* followed. Recent scholarship has challenged this view based on evidence that *muftabids* existed well into the sixteenth century, and that several prominent premodern scholars denied the closure of the doors of *ijtihad*.

See also Law; Madhhab; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Shari'a.

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IKHWAN AL-MUSLIMIN

The first modern Islamic mass movement, the Society of the Muslim Brothers (*Jam'iyyat al-ikhwān al-Muslimīn*), was born in Ismailia, Egypt, in 1928. Its founder, Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), was from a pious Muslim home and inherited his father's Salafiyya (reformist) orientation. He was strongly affected by both the rigor and devotion of Sufism and the nationalist spirit of the 1919 anti-British uprising. Upon graduating in 1927, he was appointed to teach primary school in the Suez Canal town of Ismailia, where he called people to fervently practice Islam (*da'wa*).

There al-Banna founded a society which, in its first four years, built a mosque, a boys school, and a girls school. The society's branches multiplied around the country, founding numerous Qur'an schools, clinics, and hospitals, and establishing a system of cooperative insurance for its poorer members. In the 1930s it rapidly developed its own distinctive characteristics, enabling it to endure and continue to play a key religious and sociopolitical role in many Muslim countries until today.

Features of the Ikhwān

The Society of the Muslim Brothers aims to bring complete spiritual revival (*nabda*) to society under Islam—a vision encompassing the moral reformation of youth through physical training, sports, religious and ideological indoctrination, social welfare, national pride, resistance against foreign domination, and the establishment of a state run by Islamic norms. Its members share an activist ethos, critical of traditional Islam, as well as a certain pragmatism that sanctions the use of Western ideas and technology as a tool to advance Islam. Its founder's unique talents and sense of divine call was evidenced by his celibacy and his tireless self-sacrifice in visiting the society's branches all over Egypt, as well as a commitment to writing, speaking, and organizing.

The society enjoyed phenomenal growth right from the start. Although it could boast only 5 branches in 1930, that number had jumped to 2,000 in 1949; by 1941 the society had become so influential that the British had the Egyptian prime minister arrest al-Banna and his lieutenant, Ahmad al-Sukkari, but he soon released them without British permission, fearing that their continued imprisonment would touch off a revolt that would topple his government.

The society was organized in a tight, hierarchical structure. Executive power was vested in the General Guide (*al-mursid al-'amm*), who was supported by a General Guidance Bureau (*Maktab al-irbad al-'amm*) whose members numbered fifteen in 1934 and who were handpicked by the General Guide. During the 1930s, most administrative tasks were carried out by a Central Consultative Council (the *Majlis al-shura al-markazi*)—a structure which required centralization—at the district level (*al-daw'ir*), of which there